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52 Comparative Civilizations Review 
EUROPE: 
A CIVILIZATION ON THE EDGE 
by Peter O'Brien 
Political Science 
Trinity University 
San Antonio, TX 78212 
pobrlen@trinity.edu 
Our European culture is one that has staked its all on 
the universal and the danger menacing it is that of 
perishing by the universal. 
Jean 8audrillard1 
INTRODUCTION 
Remi Brague rejects common charges of Eurocentrisim leveled 
against Western civilization. He prefers to characterize the West as 
"eccentric," meaning off center. He equates Western civilization with 
Europe and understands it as that civilization which grew out of the 
western half of the Roman Empire and with time differentiated itself 
from Byzantine and Islamic civilizations (themselves successors to the 
Roman heritage). He labels Europe eccentric because it stands (physi­
cally and figuratively) on the edge of its professed universal core. 
Ancient Greece and Christianity comprise that core. Following Leo 
Strauss, Brague employs the symbols of Athens and Jerusalem, "Its cul­
ture comes down to two elements that cannot be reduced to one anoth­
er. These two elements are the Jewish and the later Christian tradition, 
on the one hand, and the tradition of pagan antiquity on the other. 
'Athens and Jerusalem' has been proposed as an expression to symbol­
ize each of these currents with a proper name. "'2 
Curiously, neither core city has historically been considered part of 
Europe.3 This marginality, Brague insists, runs much deeper than mere 
geography. Rome derived its culture and institutions from Greek 
Hellenism and Europe its civilization from Roman. Europeans have had 
then only indirect or secondary access via Rome and Latin to Ancient 
Greece and Greek. Similarly, the Christian God made His Covenant, not 
with Europeans, but with Jews in their language. "Christianity is to the 
old Covenant what the Romans were to the Greeks. The Christians 
know - even if they are constantly in danger of forgetting, as they have 
done on several occasions - that they are grafted onto the Jewish people 
and onto their experience of God."• Greeks feel directly connected to 
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God because the good news of His Incarnated Son was spread and can­
onized in their language in (for the Greeks) the superior New 
Testament.' But Europeans were left with only secondary linguistic 
access to both Holy Scriptures. "The Church is 'Roman' because it 
repeats the operation carried out by the Romans in regard to Hellenism. 
but in relation to Israel.'06 
Brague claims that this "Roman attitude" or state of "secondarity" 
has saddled Europe with a profound "feeling of inferiority" dating to its 
inception.7 As a result, Europeans have felt themselves uncomfonably 
situated (geographically but even more so culturally) somewhere 
between absolute knowledge, understood as Hellenic and Christian uni­
versalism, and barbarity, a state of ultimate ignorance and irrelevance. 
European attempts to escape this awkward liminality "between the 
uphill classical and the downhill barbarity" have found expression in 
repeated renaissances (e.g., twelfth century, Quatrocentro, 
Reformation) designed to appropriate the core culture by perfecting it in 
the West as well as in conquests to recapture core territories (e.g., 
Crusades, modem imperialism).' 
As I read it, Eurocentrism belongs with these effons to re-center 
Europe, though less by recovering the core than shifting it. 
Eurocentrists depict a modern world with Europe at its center. The 
adjective "modern" is important. Serious Eurocentrists, at least since 
the Pirenne thesis,9 no longer assert an uninterrupted progression from 
ancient Athens through Rome onto Florence, Paris and finally to 
Brussels today. They acknowledge that during the Middle Ages Europe 
sat on the edge of more powerful empires, more vibrant economies, 
more sophisticated cultures to its east to which Europeans had only tan­
gential and conditioned access. Modernity, beginning roughly in 1500, 
changed all that. Through cultural renaissance (e.g., science), political 
reform (e.g., democracy), economic dynamism (e.g., capitalism), and 
military domination (e.g., imperialism) Europeans crafted a modem 
iteration of their civilization that became the world's central axis. •0 
I contend below that judged by their own subjective standards 
modem Europeans failed to re-center the modern world around Europe. 
Thus, even if such a re-centering in fact transpired, Europeans were not 
fully convinced of. it. They continued to fret over their marginality and 
secondarity. I provide two types of support for my thesis, indirect and 
direct. First, l mine recent anti-Eurocentric scholarship for actual devel­
opments known to educated Europeans which must have belied 
European centrality. Second, l highlight prominent Europeans who 
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expressed doubt over Europe's unrivaled greatness. Modem Europeans, 
it turns out, were never quite as smug vis-a-vis rival civilizations as 
Eurocentrism suggests 
RIVALS TO THE EAST 
Let us not lose sight of the deep sense of inferiority with which 
Europeans entered the modem age. Throughout the Middle Ages, they 
repeatedly either directly experienced or heard tales of larger empires 
(e.g., Abbasid, Mongol, Ottoman), fiercer warriors (e.g., Saladin, Jingiz 
Khan, Mehrned the Conqueror), speedier religions (e.g., Islamic con­
versions), wiser savants (e.g., Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides), love­
lier cities (e.g., COrdoba and Constantinople), finer products (e.g., silk, 
glass, pottery), tastier foods (e.g., oranges, bananas, rice, sugar) all ema­
nating from the east." Put differently, if Europeans were to reach a sense 
of superiority, they had a long road to travel. 
The year 1492 or thereabouts suggests itself as a good starting point 
for that journey to self-confidence. In that year the Spaniards expelled 
the Muslims once and for all from the Iberian Peninsula, and Columbus 
discovered the New World. Twelve years earlier Ivan Ill had thrown off 
the Tartar yoke. And in 1497 Vasco da Gama rounded the horn of Africa. 
Furthermore, the Renaissance was by that time in full flower and 
spreading its potent pollen well beyond Italy. As the epithet "rebirth;; 
implies, Europe began emerging from its "Dark" or "Middle" Ages to 
take center stage in world history, Whatever its exact origins, moderni­
ty is invariably understood by Eurocentrists as an age dating to some­
where around 1500 and characterized by "The Rise of the West,"12 "The 
Origins of the "European World-Economy,"13 or simply "The European 
Miracle."•• 
The Russians may have slipped out from the Tartar Yoke in 1480, 
but the rest of Christendom remained imperiled by the menacing Turk 
untH as 1ate as 1683 - the last siege of Vienna. Near the close of the fif­
teenth century, the Ottomans, long feared only as a land power, fortified 
their navy and expanded their control of the Mediterranean so that 
Europeans traded only on Ottoman tettns - not vice versa. i5 Between 
1499 and 1503 the Turks defeated the venerable Venetian fleet to enter 
the Gulf of Corinth, captured Lepanto, and forced Venice to pay annual 
tribute to the Sublime Porte. 16 They captured Rhodes in 1522, Algiers in 
1529, Tripoli in 1551! Cyprus in 1571 and Tunis in 1574.1' These victo­
ries secured a naval monopoly in the eastern Mediterranean (not to 
mention the Black Sea") for the Ottomans and enabled the likes of the 
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legendary Barbarossa to menace the southern coast of Europe, thus 
practically nullifying the pacification of the Arabs in 1492." Tales 
spread through Europe of Christian women enslaved and fattened up on 
bread dipped into syrup to enhance their salability. 20 
For nearly a century the Europeans could do little to halt Ottoman 
naval gains. In fact, the young zealot, Loyola, had his heart set on mis­
sionary work in Jerusalem in 1537 but had to settle for Rome due to 
Ottoman control of sea routes (So thank the Turks for the Jesuits!).21 
Don John of Austria finally made a stand at Lepanto in 1571. Though 
touted by Europeans as a victory of Crusade-like proportions - Ali 
Pasha's head was ceremoniously mounted on a spike on the prow of+ a 
Turkish vessel while the crescent was replaced with a cross - the result 
hardly turned the Mediterranean into a European lake or the Ottoman 
Empire into a vassal. Rather, the two foes reached a naval stalemate of 
sorts. Hans Khevenh Iler, who fought at Lepanto, seemed to realize as 
much in noting in his dairy that the touted victory failed to secure a sin­
gle additional yard of territory for Christianity.22 
Venetian Senator, Costantino Garzoni, who authored a report of his 
travels to Istanbul after Lepanto, wrote of the sultan: "This most pow­
erful emperor's forces are of. two kinds, those of the sea and those of the 
land, and both are terrifying." The Grand Turk continued to have the 
power "to torment all of Christendom.''Zl 
In 1573 the Venetian ambassador to the Ottoman capital reported 
back to his government that the sultan lay poised to establish universal 
monarchy: "the Ottoman emperor has in the course of continuing victo­
ries seized so many provinces and brought so many kingdoms under his 
yoke and, in so doing, has made the whole world fear him, it is not 
beyond reason to wonder if he might not finally go so far as to establish 
a universal monarchy." The next ambassador insisted that it would be 
vain to think the Turks could be stopped (barring divine intervention). 
It should be added that these diplomatic reports were subsequently pub­
lished (in French too) and widely read throughout Europe well into the 
seventeenth century.2A 
As indicated, the Turks continued their ravaging campaigns on 
land. In 1499 they again occupied Otranto and then used that foothold 
to maraud villages surrounding Venice. Small wonder that Machiavelli 
lauded the discipline and morale of Turkish troops over and beyond that 
of Christian soldiers.:is Large numbers of European plebeians came to 
believe in the prophesy that they would be overrun by the Turks - a sen­
timent Luther felt compelled to denounce in his "War Sermon" of 
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1529.2'6 Meanwhile, the learned debated a controversy started in 1551 by 
a Jewish author, Rabbi Isaac Abravanel, who contended that the 
Ottomans were fulfilling the Prophesy of Daniel. The legend foretold 
that a universal monarchy of God on earth was destined to follow in the 
wake of the four great ancient pagan kingdoms (Babylonian-Assyrian, 
Persian, Greek and Roman).:1  
Even half-hearted Ottoman excursions into Europe proved success­
ful. In a series of Danubian campaigns the Turks first captured Belgrade 
(1521) and from there crossed the Hungarian plain to lay (unsuccessful) 
siege to Vienna in 1529. The Habsburgs were forced to tolerate in 
Hungary, long the critical buffer zone between them and the Turks, the 
Ottoman puppet regime of John Zapolyai. Over the ensuing decades the 
Turks lay poised to swallow up all of St. Stephen's dominions, includ­
ing Buda in 1541, and beyond into southern Ukraine and Lithuania. 
Ferdinand I stopped the advance only by brokering a deal in 1562 
whereby Hungary was partitioned into three parts - two loyal to the 
Turks.21 The Treaty of Adrianople six years later brought further embar­
rassment to the Habsburgs, who were forced to pay annual tribute to 
Istanbul. Selim II generously referred to it as a "gift" to spare 
Maximilian II humiliation.l9 
In this milieu, Venetian ambassadors to the Porte understandably 
reported back home that the Turks "are the greatest fighters in the 
world," utterly "invincible." "Henceforth, all Christendom should fear 
incurring a great extermination. ")II Things looked so dire that a French 
poet in 1555 exhorted Europeans to abandon their continent to the Turks 
and re-establish Europe in the New World.31 Five years later compatriot 
Guillaume Postel published his widely read De la republique des Tures, 
in which he concluded that France could only def eat the Turk by emu­
lating him.» 
The Europeans had effectively accepted a border between 
Christianity and Islam in the very heart of Europe.33 The Ottomans 
remained a thorn in Europe's side for at least another century. They raid­
ed as far north as Poland in 1620,14 then again in 1672.3s They took the 
Western Ukraine from the Poles in 1676 only to lose it to the Russians 
in 1681.36 Most Europeans interpreted Halley's comet of 1682 as a 
divine signal of defeat at the hands of the Turks. The latter seemed to 
fulfill the prophecy the next year by laying final (but again failed) siege 
to Vienna. As late as the tum of the eighteenth century Sir William 
Temple called the Ottoman Empire "the fiercest. . .in the world. "37 
That said, there is no denying that 1683 marked the end of further 
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Ottoman advances into Europe. Here began the gradual degeneration of 
the Turk into the "sick man of Europe," who had to submit to such dis­
advantageous settlements as the Treaty of Kuchak-Kainardji (1774). 
But keep in mind that the Turks took Crete from the Venetians in 1715, 
converted countless Christians to Islam, and did not relinquish the 
"miniature continent" until 1898.)1 The Ottomans also managed to 
repulse the Russians in 1711 and the Austrians in 1736-939 and again in 
1787.40 The Balkans remained under Ottoman control until the nine­
teenth century. It was not without good cause that Metternich said of the 
road leading east out of Vienna, "Asia begins at the Landstrasse."" 
With the infidel constantly banging at their doors, Europeans took 
to scrutinizing the enemy. What they saw at the Porte impressed them. 
European diplomats, who regularly referred to European realms as 
"kingdoms" but the Ottoman as "empire," marveled that the sultan 
"rules in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe" in this "vastissimo impero dei 
Turchi." Istanbul was widely held to be the world's most splendid city, 
"the most beautiful thing in the world there is to see."•2 Moreover, the 
sultan, or more accurately the Grand Vizier, controlled a gigantic, effi­
cient and wealthy administrative apparatus in comparison to which 
European bureaucracies paled.0 
Nothing garnered more attention in the reports of European diplo­
mats than the stunning fact that the sultan's revenues regularly exceed­
ed expenses (in one report by 30 percent, another 47percent) ... If that 
were not enough, the sultan had both the aristocracy and the clergy 
firmly under his thumb - things of which European princes could hard­
ly boast." "Obedience, considered by all to be the most solid foundation 
for any empire, maintains this one without a doubt," noted Antonio 
Errizo in his 1557 report on the Porte. "Revenues, peoples, and obedi­
ence," wrote Marco Minio in 1522, these were the sultan's key "pow­
ers."46 
It speaks volumes that Europeans, not Turks, called Suleyman "the 
Magnificent" and the sultan generally "the Grand Signor."" But the 
greatest compliment that could possibly be paid to the Turkish monarch 
was to acknowledge him as the rightful heir to the Roman Empire. In 
Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem (1568) Jean Bodin con­
cluded: 
It would be far more just to regard the Osmaoli sultan as the 
inheritor of the Roman Empire, for it was he who, after cap­
turing the imperial city of Byzantium from the Christians, 
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went on to conquer from the Persians that region of 
Babylonia which is spoken of in the Book of Daniel, adding 
to the ancient provinces of Rome all the land across the 
Danube until the banks of the Borysthenes ... we must rec­
ognize that the prophecy of Daniel can be most appropriate­
ly interpreted as applying to the sultan of the Turks ... 
Fifty-three years earlier Machiavelli counseled his prince that true 
greamess came only to those rulers "who command their expeditions in 
person as the Roman Emperors did in the beginning. and as the Sultan 
does at the present time. "•9 If we look to the future instead of the past, 
we might say with Lucette Valensi that Europe's relations with the 
Turks were 
not unlike those between much of the world and the United 
States in the period since the end of the Second World War. 
The political, economic, and military hegemony of this new 
power - this youthful imperialism - may be ill abided, 
but its achievements and its political regime dazzle and fas­
cinate nonetheless. One might wish that it had less power, 
but no one thinks to challenge its legitimacy.'° 
As with America today, fashion often followed wealth and power 
then. Davies notes a "craze for Turkish styles and artifacts" in sixteenth­
century Europe.)• Through the eighteenth century European aestheti­
cians claimed the most beautiful people were to be found in the 
Ottoman Empire.$1 European rulers continued well into the seventeenth 
century the practice of sending envoys to the Levant with instructions 
to bring back materials of academic importance (The Turks sent no such 
envoys in the other direction.). Scholars the likes of Leibniz and Racine 
could not wait to study what the scouts retrieved." Man y chairs of 
Arabic were formed in European universities, beginning with Paris in 
1529. Persian and Turkish studies followed. 
It was Muslim control of the Mediterranean that forced the 
Portuguese and Spanish to take the circuitous routes to India that led 
them deep into the Indian and Atlantic Oceans and the "Age of 
Discovery." In the Americas small bands of Europeans easily overthrew 
whole empires like the Aztecs and Incas. They went on to found and 
expand colonies and spread European language, culture and religion 
among the Indians. This experience clearly enhanced the European self­
image and even helped assuage some of the shame stemming from loss­
es to the Turks.� 
The experience in Asia differed markedly. When da Gama rounded 
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the horn of Africa, he "entered a highly sophisticated trading area" full 
of "hostile ... Muslim rulers or traders in all the harbours which he visit­
ed."�$ He only managed to navigate his vessel to India with the help of 
a Muslim pilot who knew the waters.'6 Wherever the Portuguese docked 
they found Muslim vessels already moored there.. Furthermore, 
Christian wares "were crude and unattractive in Eastern eyes."" When 
da Gama returned to Lisbon in April 1499 and showed his king what he 
had acquired, the monarch replied: "it would seem that it is not we who 
have discovered them, but they who· have discovered us."$8 
European backwardness was to be expected. After all, the 
Europeans hailed from an impoverished economy in comparison to the 
prosperity, even opulence of Asia. Fernao Mendes Pinto seemed to con­
firm so much after his visit to the Orient between 1521 and 1558. There 
he walked the markets of Peking "as if in a daze" at the quantities of 
"silk, lace, canvas, clothes of cotton and linen, marten pearls, gold-dust 
and gold-bullion." "All these things were to be had in such abundance 
that I feel as if there are not enough words in the dictionary to name 
them all. "S9 
Over a century later the Director of the British East India Company, 
Sir Josiah Child, stated the obvious when he noted that Indian "trade 
with all the Eastern nations ... is ten times as much as ours and all the 
European nations put together.''60 As late as 1750 the rest of the world 
still out-produced Europe and North America by a ratio of nearly 4 to 
1.61 India's GDP still tripled Britain's.62 This vast economic advantage 
goes far in explaining why "from 1500-1800 relations between East and 
West were ordinarily conducted within a framework and on terms estab­
lished by the Asian nations."63 
The geo-political climate was nothing like that in the Americas. In 
the Mogul and Ming empires the Europeans encountered truly mighty 
powers unlikely to succumb like the Aztecs and Incas. In fact, the 
Europeans were too busy expressing their awe and wonder of these 
majestic Oriental kingdoms to imagine subduing them.64 The 
starry-eyed newcomers were lucky if the emperor even condescended 
to tolerate them within the realm.6$ Such things contemporaries knew 
thanks to the virtual "flood tide" of literature about the Orient that 
washed over Europe from the sixteenth century on.66 
European readers enjoyed marveling at descriptions of exotic 
places such as the grand Mogul court at Agra or the lavish Burmese 
metropolis of Pegu with its ten thousand elephants.61 Geographies typi­
cally described Asia in glowing terms. "It was vast in size, rich in prod-
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ucts, the seat of great monarchies and the cradle of the ans and the sci­
ences." Cicero's remark that "Asia is truly so rich and fertile ... (that) it 
easily surpasses all lands" frequently turned up.61 India earned accolades 
like "the best and goodliest land in the world" or "an earthly paradise.''69 
Until the nineteenth century it was not uncommon for Britons stationed 
in India lo adopt Mughal culture, even convert lo Islam.'° CuhuralJy, 
these Europeans were light years away from the arrogant Tohomas 
Macaulay, who in the nineteenth century claimed one shelf of English 
literature superior to all that had ever been written in lndia.11 
But no land bewitched Europeans quite like China. Commissioned 
by Pope Gregory XIll in 1583, Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza's Historia 
de las cosas mas notables, ritos y costumbres de/ gran Reyno de la 
China (1585) molded Europeans' image of the Ming and Ch 'ing dynas­
ties. He divided "this mightie kingdome .. .into fifteen provinces, that 
every one of them is bigger than the greatest kingdome that we do 
understand to be in all Europe. '172 In the seventeenth century Isaac 
Vossius typified European amazement with Chinese science: "If any 
man should make a collection of all the inventions and all the produc­
tions that every nation, which now is, or ever has been, upon the face of 
the globe, the whole would fall short, either as to number or quality, of 
what is lo be met with in China."'3 English SinophiJe, Sir William 
Temple, deemed it "endless to enumerate all the excellent orders of this 
state, which seem contrived by a reach of sense and wisdom, beyond 
what we meet with in any other government of the world."74 
From the time of the first successful Jesuit mission in 1583 until the 
rebuke of Lord Macartney's trade mission in 1793, China mesmerized 
the European mind. Hundreds of books by European visitors to Asia 
were published back home. Of this body of literature Donald Lach and 
Edwin Van Kley write: "Few literate Europeans could have been com­
pletely untouched by it.'17' Philosophers the likes of Montesquieu, 
Quesnay, Fontenelle, Diderot, Rousseau, Leibniz, Bayle, and Voltaire 
idealized China as a veritable philosopher-kingship and used its exam­
ple to heap scorn on benighted European ways.76 Philologists keen to 
reform crude European vernaculars praised Chinese as a "paragon of 
linguistic rationality." 
Artists embraced Chinese styles as a refreshing break from hide­
bound European conventions.n Chinoiserie became the preferred deco­
rative style in homes.,. Sages sought to establish Chinese academies on 
European soil.19 Officials envied the mandarins' uncontested authority. 
One of Louis XV's ministers averred that what France sorely needed 
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was "an injection of Chinese spirit.'"° Leibniz had counseled Louis' 
father: " ... everything exquisite and admirable comes from the East 
Indies ... Learned people have remarked that in the whole world there is 
no commerce comparable to that of China."  Adam Smith concurred as 
late as 1776: "China is a much richer country than any pan of Europe" 
(and he saw no change on the horizon).n And Napoleon hoped to trans­
fer his base of operations to the Orient because "Europe is a molehill. 
All great revolutions and empires have been in the Orient."11 
RIVAL TO THE WEST 
Awareness of Oriental grandeur notwithstanding, evidence of a 
westward shiftjn the world's locus of power mounted during the eigh­
teenth century.· The Europeans, however, expressed fear that the shift 
was moving too far west, namely to America. America, not Europe, 
would become the place where the achievements of the modem era 
would be most fully realized. As far back as colonial times, Americans 
were predicting and Europeans dreading this very outcome. The premo­
nitions especially crescendoed after 1776. 
With the American Revolution the upstart republicans began 
sculpting a fully distinct society that threatened to become the envy of 
the world. Put differently, Nonh America gave Europeans a glimpse 
into a likely future - one in which Europe would not predominate. We 
might say America robbed Europeans of their own sense of preemi­
nence in the very years when the world's axis did tum around Europe. 
If Islamic civilization represented to Europe the classic archenemy, 
America came fonh more like a rookie teammate who threatens some­
day to bench the squad's star player. 
The American Revolution hardly overturned Britain, let alone 
Europe - a reason hidebound Europeans refuse to label it a "revolu­
tion." The rebels did not emerge victorious until 1783 (and only with the 
help of the French) and did not really neutralize the British until the 
Treaty of Ghent in 1815. Economically the United States remained in a 
"classical imperial relationship" with Britain, exporting raw materials, 
most notably cotton, and importing manufactured goods." And, of 
course, the young bastard republic never invaded Britain or any other 
inch of Europe until the twentieth century. 
But the defiant Americans did invade Europe's psychic space. 
Britain Jay poised after vanquishing the French in 1763 to become the 
largest empire on the planet since the Roman. Continental Europeans, 
even the French, took to admiring and emulating mighty England.16 The 
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Americans burst the British bubble. It was generally admitted in Europe 
that American independence signaled the complete abolition of the 
entire European colonial system. " George III seemed to have sensed so 
much in 1781 when he remarked: "the dye is now cast whether this shall 
be a great Empire or the least dignified of European states."" 
The ramifications of the War of Independence extended further. 
Success made it impossible for Europeans confidently to dismiss 
America's caddish self-aggrandizement. From the time the first pil­
grims touched shore, American braggarts shamelessly boasted the 
prospects of their new homeland with such claims as establishing a 
"new Jerusalem" or "city on a hill." Tom Paine boldly predicted that 
"What Athens was in miniature America will be in magnitude. The one 
was the wonder of the ancient world; the other is becoming the admira­
tion, the model of the present."89 Edmund Burke agreed, if reluctantly: 
"Nothing less than a convulsion that will shake the globe to its centre 
can ever restore the European nations to that liberty by which they were 
once so distinguished. The Western world was the seat of freedom until 
another, more Western, was discovered; and that other will be probably 
its asylum when it is hunted down in every other part.'"° 
Burke was not alone. By as early as 1760, according to English 
ciergyman Andrew Burnaby, the idea that the crux of history had moved 
from the Middle East to Europe and was headed west was widely held. 
"An idea strange as it is visionary, has entered into the minds of the gen­
erality of mankind, that empire is traveling westward; and every one is 
looking forward with eager and impatient expectation to that.�estined 
moment, when America is to give law to the rest of the world." ·voltaire 
seemed to concur when he wrote of "that golden age of which men talk 
so much and which probably has never existed anywhere except in 
Pennsylvania. •><n So did Horace Walpole: "The next Augustan age will 
dawn on the other side of the Atlantic.''9) 
The American Revolution turned any remaining heads in Europe 
that had hitherto ignored America. European visitors flooded into the 
United States as if into a zoo to see an exotic creature: democracy.94 
Most of them sent letters back home and even published their observa­
tions - so many, that early in the nineteenth century publications on 
America comprised "a major share of the European publishing indus­
try.'095 
"From St. Petersburg to Lisbon" Europeans heard sung the praises 
of the maverick republic.96 From Switzerland: "I am tempted to believe 
that North America is the country where reason and humanity will 
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develop more rapidly than anywhere else.'997 From Venice: "If only the 
union of Provinces is preserved, it is reasonable to expect that, with the 
favorable effects of time, and of European arts and sciences, it wilJ 
become the most formidable power in the world.'998 From Norway: 
"God help America to fight its way to liberty that mankind may not per­
ish in serfdom.''99 From Poland: "only Americans in the whole world 
have the right to celebrate [freedom];" Europeans "are crushed whether 
by chains at home or by foreign bonds; from the Tiber to the Volga peo­
ple groan in fetters."'00 From Germany: "America, you are better off. 
than our continent, the Old."101 
Nowhere, of course, did news of.the American Revolution ripple as 
in France. Countless Frenchmen rallied behind the American rebels 
with declarations like that of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot in 1778: 
"They are the hope of the human race; they may well become its 
model."'02 Four years later Crevecoeur labeled the United States "the 
most perfect society now existing in the world."103 The list of admirers 
stretches far: Lafayette, Chastellux, Robin, Due de la Rochefoucauld, 
Condorcet, Lameth, Dumas, Comte de Seguer, Vkomte de Noailles, 
Saint Simon, Du Pont, Mirabeau, Pierre Louis, Comte de Roederer, 
Adrien Duport, Abbe Sieyes, Guy Jean Target, Talleyrand.'°' Needless 
to say, America had its detractors in France, but they comprised the 
minority.'°' 
The French Revolution drew hopeful attention back onto Europe. 
After all, the American Revolution took place on the edge of the civi­
lized world. By contrast, the French struggle on behalf of Liberte, Egal­
ite, and Fraternite transpired in the very heart of civilization. The 
momentous political event seemed poised to realize the ideals of the 
Enlightenment and usher in a new modem epoch with Europe in the 
vanguard. In the end, of course, the French Revolution dashed more 
hopes than it inspired. It failed where the American Revolution succeed­
ed, namely in the promotion of liberty and democracy, and stormed a 
path toward despotism, whether progressive or reactionary, that bas­
tardized Europe's experience with modernity. The facts are well known: 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), abolition of 
monarchy and establishment of the republic (1791 ), Robespierre's 
"Reign of Terror" ( 1793-94), coup d'etat of Napoleon Bonaparte 
(1799), establishment of Empire and Emperor (1804), the defeat of 
Napoleon and Bourbon Restoration (1814). In the meantime, the 
Napoleonic Wars ravaged the continent, as Europeans everywhere were 
forced to take sides with or against the Revolution. 
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Because such elevated hopes attended the Revolution, its mutation 
into tyranny occasioned profound gloom. A mood of disillusionment 
spread over the continent.106 Friedrich von Gentz lamented: "The door 
of hope seemed to me closed forever, to Germany and to Europe." For 
"the men of the Revolution intended to unite all of the nations of the 
earth in one great cosmopolitan confederation, but they succeeded only 
in unleashing the cruelest world war that has ever shaken society and 
tom it apart. "1(77 William Wordsworth mourned "this melancholy waste 
of hopes o'erthrown," while Chateaubriand felt "we are sailing along an 
unknown coast, in the midst of darkness and the storm."'°' Edmund 
Burke concluded: "The glory of Europe is extinguished."'""' Once 
defeated and exiled to St. Helena, Napoleon reflected that he had tried 
"to bring everywhere unity of laws, of principles, of opinions, senti­
ments, views, and interests. Then perhaps it would have been possible 
to dream for the great European family the application of the American 
Congress or of the amphictyonies of Greece."110 George Friedrich Hegel 
admitted that such hopes lay with "America ... the country of the 
future ... the land of desire for all those who are weary of the historical 
arsenal of old Europe."111 
America did not disappoint. As the infant republic matured it 
democratized much faster than Europe. To be sure. most of America's 
founding fathers opposed democracy and preferred "natural aristocra­
cy" in which an elite cadre of genuinely virtuous and visionary men 
would wield the instrument of a strong centralized government to steer 
the commonwealth in an enlightened direction. These Federalists failed 
due to a wave of first Jeffersonian, then Jacksonian populism that 
swamped elitism in America. Proponents of the two anti-Federalists 
demanded expansion of the franchise, so that de facto universal (white) 
male suffrage obtained by 1820. They used the ballot box not only to 
put Jefferson in the White House in 1800 and Jackson in 1828, but to 
elect countless hoi po/loi to public office at all levels. 112 
Success at the polls spurred more plebeians to vote. Turnout nor­
mally hovered below 20 percent before 1828 but climbed thereafter to 
over 70 percent."' Jackson, in particular, exalted the ordinary man and 
helped spawn a general leveling in American society that extended far 
beyond politics to social, religious and economic hierarchies."� 
"Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my 
stay in the United States," wrote Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835, "noth­
ing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition 
among the people."115 The Due de La Rochefoucauld observed that 
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even backwoods wretches "consider themselves on an equal footing 
with the best educated people of the country, and upon the principle of 
equality they intrude themselves into every company. "116 Fanny 
Trollope's popular Domes1ic Manners of 1he Americans of 1832 immor­
talized the picture of America as a vast bog of equality and vulgarity 
where the tasteless habits of the lowly asphyxiated the good manners of 
the respectable. In 1851 Heinrich Heine echoed her ridicule of 
America's equality: 
I have sometimes thought to sail 
To America the Free 
To that Freedom Stable where 
All the boors live equally. 
But I fear a land where men 
Chew tobacco in platoons, 
There's no king among the pins, 
And they spit without spittoons. m 
Of course, slavery conspicuously stained America's democratic 
fabric but was finally abolished in 1865. 
In Europe democracy continued to flounder. Charles Tilly discerns 
"no one-way path toward democracy to trace across Europe between 
1815 and 2000. Almost every country that moved significantly toward 
broad, equal, protected consultation [representation] during one period 
or another veered back toward authoritarianism or petty tyranny during 
some subsequent periods."'" 
In 1848, in panicular, democratic revolutions broke out across 
Europe and threatened to defeat inequality once and for all. As with the 
French Revolution, however, European democracy was soon stunted. In 
France Louis Napoleon trounced liberal opponents in the presidential 
election of 1849 and then used the office to purge the government and 
army of opponents, wheedled the National Assembly into disenfran­
chising three million voters most likely to oppose him in 1850, staged a 
coup de' eiat in 1851, and had himself declared emperor like his uncle 
in 1852. The French emperor dispatched a regiment to Rome to crush 
the newly declared Italian republic and reinstall Pope Pius IX. The 
Austrian army had already choked the democratic forces of Piedmont, 
a victory that paved the way in Tuscany and Lombardy for the return to 
power of sovereigns who set about abrogating the constitutions of 1848. 
With the help of the tsar's army, the Hapsburgs extinguished the 
fledgling Hungarian Republic. Frederick William IV deployed troops to 
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quell democratic agitation in Berlin in 1848 and in Saxony and Baden 
in 1849. In Italy, Austria, and Germany, then, absolutist monarchy was 
again firmly ensconced within two years. In France, a modern police 
state had replaced democracy. Universal male suffrage would not reach 
Germany until 1871, France 1875, Britain 1884, Austria 1907, and Italy 
in 1912. Europe's second great experiment in democracy had, like the 
first, foiled visions of a new modem democratic age ushering forth from 
the Old World. 
Modernity no doubt arrived in Europe in the nineteenth century, but 
it was a modernity scarred by the lingering sores of the ancien regime.119 
Flaccid democracy helps to explain why Europe's sharpest students of 
society harmoniously predicted the inevitable failure of the political 
ideology and structure. Writing at the close or turn of the nineteenth 
century, Max Weber, Gaetona Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert 
Michels (the virtual fathers of sociology) each subscribed to a variant of 
the latter's "iron law of oligarchy." 
Meanwhile, in America widespread commercialization followed by 
ubiquitous consumerism caused leveling in the economy akin to democ­
ratization in politics. The three taken together elevated the common 
man in ways he could only dream of in Europe and reali2e by immigrat­
ing to America. 
America earned a reputation as a place where one could quite liter­
ally buy happiness. As far back as 1697, Sir Thomas Lawrence, secre­
tary of Maryland, reported back to London, "they feed their Hoggs with 
better than Dutchesses Eat in Hyde Park. "110 A century later a German 
immigrant wrote to her family back home that one could live "as well 
as a count or prince can in all of Germany."121 Adam Smith claimed, 
"there are no colonies of which the progress has been more rapid than 
that of the English in North America."122 
Favorable economic conditions so fostered commerce that by 18W 
America had blossomed into a profoundly commercialized society in 
which the ceaseless pecuniary pursuits of ordinary people predominat­
ed in a way unparalleled elsewhere.123 This fact is sometimes lost on 
those who associate commercialization with industrialization, which 
sparked in America first in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 
reality, America experienced massive "preindustrial" commercializa­
tion as its people scattered across the continent brokering at every 
turn.124 
During the first century of the republic the American market under­
went a change from a focus on production for local sale (often through 
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barter) to production for distant, eventually national sale (always for 
cash). This transformation further opened the door for the onslaught of 
consumerism beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Amidst these changes the economy rapidly expanded, its annual rate of 
growth doubling twice between 1812 and 1850 and reaching 3 percent 
soon thereafter.125 By the 1840s New York City was the fastest-growing 
large industrial area in the world.'26 The Big Apple, combined with 
Boston, Bal timore and Philadelphia, mushroomed into an integrated 
market that enveloped the Northeast. Like tentacles, roads, bridges, 
canals, and rails reached out from these ports and carried their manufac­
tured products into the hinterland. Trade on the Erie Canal multiplied 
thirteenfold from the 1820s to 1850s. Though its first trains did not roll 
until 1833,127 by 1840 America doubled Europe in rail mileage.128 To be 
sure, Great Britain led the world in economic production throughout 
much of our period, but America was constantly gaining ground, 
expanding nearly twice as fast as Europe.129 
By 1870 America's GNP equaled and by 1913 tripled Britain's.'io 
By the 1890sAmerica led the world in manufacturing as well as in coal, 
iron and steel production. By 1919 the United States cultivated and 
manufactured more than the rest of the world combined. New York 
replaced London as the world's financial center.m 
Countless observers highlighted mammonism as Americans' most 
defining traitm The Due de La Rochefoucauld, for example, deplored 
in America "an immoderate love of money. "133 Tocqueville had 
observed that Americans are "swayed by no impulse but the pursuit of 
wealth." Trollope held that no conversation took place in America with­
out mention of the word "dollar." "Worldly pursuits," averred Heinrich 
Heine, "are their true religion, and money is their God, their only 
Almighty God." Dickens recalled from his visit that "all their cares, 
hopes, joys, affections, and associations seemed to be melted down into 
dollars." But it was left to Captain Marryat to make the most preposter­
ous observation, maintaining that "dollar worship" affected Americans' 
physiology and caused them all to look alike. Herbert Spencer later 
advanced a similar argument.1" 
Unremitting commercialization eroded America's class structure 
and further differentiated it from Europe. Most notably, the lower class 
lost its defining characteristic (in Europe): acceptance of its station in 
life. America's poor and propertyless refused to settle for the status quo. 
Though they did not always succeed, they remained optimistic that they 
could one day prosper. As a result, America transformed into a middle-
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class society rather than, as in Europe, a society with a middle class. The 
values emerging from the middle class were taken to be universal rather 
than specific. m "It happened nowhere else in the Western world quite 
like this."'36 No wonder, then, that his opponents, before ultimately opt­
ing for the guillotine, considered punishing Louis XVI by exiling him 
to Philadelphia, where he would have to live out the remainder of his 
life a drab and dreary bourgeois. m 
But industrialization alone did not further distinguish America in 
the world. After all, Britain's industrialization preceded and Germany's 
and Japan's coincided with America's. But industrialization in America 
did complete the establishment of. a truly integrated continental market. 
Railroad companies, in particular, filled in the last holes in the nation's 
monstrous infrastructure, by 1885 connecting not big cities (which were 
already joined) but more significantly small towns like a Kewanee, 
Illinois or an Aberdeen, South Dakota. This turned virtually all 56 mil­
lion Americans into objects of mass marketing and distribution.us 
The national market made an ideal breeding ground for con­
sumerism. The tendency to evaluate life according to the products one 
purchased arose toward the end of the nineteenth century and came to 
dominate American life by the 1920s. Its influence stretched far outside 
economics into politics, religion, science, culture and beyond. This con­
sumerist "revolution" further propelled America past Europe as the 
leader of modernity. Though industrialization surely deserves its place 
in the list of attributes of modernity, consumerism has proven more con­
sequential. 139 "The commodity became and has remained the one subject 
of mass culture, the centerpiece of everyday life, the focal point of. all 
representation, the dead center of the modem world.""° Certainly by the 
end of the nineteenth century commentators like Thorstein Veblen, 
whose Theor.j of the Leisure Class was published in 1899, realized that 
the consumer was overtaking the producer as the most important eco­
nomic actor in the modem world.1'1 
America steered the juggernaut to consumerism not only because 
of. its enormous market. After all, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan 
for that matter, marketed their products beyond their admittedly small­
er national markets. America led because it democratized consumerism 
faster than competitors. Everywhere consumerism originated with the 
urban middle classes.1•2 But in America it spread quickly (though hard­
ly immediately")) down the social hierarchy and out into the country­
side, becoming a shared national way of life. In Europe, by contrast, 
entrenched forces, often the same ones that impeded democracy, slowed 
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consumerism."' 
Put differently, America's modem political claim to fame, democ­
racy, aided in the establishment of its modern economic claim to fame, 
consumerism. Indeed, Hannah Arendt disparagingly suggests that con­
sumerism not only fed on, but virtually replaced democracy as 
Americans became more enamored of the opportunity to consume than 
vote: 
The American dream, as the nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies under the impact of mass immigration came to under­
stand it, was neither the dream of the American Revolution 
- the foundation of freedom - nor the dream of the French 
Revolution - the liberation of man: it was. unhappily, the 
dream of a "promised land" where milk and honey flow. 
And the fact that the development of modem technology 
was so soon able to realize this dream beyond anyone's 
wildest expectation quite naturally had the effect of con­
firming for the dreamers that they really bad come to live in 
the best of all possible worlds."' 
In keeping with the consumerist ethos, Americans did in fact con­
sume more during these years. Already by 1879 production of consumer 
durable goods was growing faster than producer goods.146 Increasingly 
Americans elected to spend their earnings on what were once consid­
ered luxuries. For instance, the years 1900-1929 saw a 161 % boost in 
spending on clothing (largely a necessity) compared to 199% on person­
al care products (mostly luxuries); 168% on housing compared to 322% 
on transportation (mainly cars); 164% on medical care compared to 
285% on recreation."' Discretionary spending (beyond housing, cloth­
ing, food) jumped from 20% to 35% during the same period. "8 
In all fairness, American consumers enjoyed an edge; they had 
more money. Between 1925 and 1929, for example, real wages in 
America exceeded those in Britain by 60%. Americans' incomes had 
two-and-a-half-times the buying power of French. America also bene­
fited from a steady stream of immigrants arriving with little more than 
the clothes on their backs who needed and wanted to consume in order 
to fit into the "American way of life." Understandably, Americans 
bought more. By 1929, one in five Americans owned a car, one in 43 
Britons, one in 335 Italians. "American prosperity gave quite ordinary 
citizens cars, eiectric gadgets, telephones, and ready-to-wear fashions 
for which European masses would have to wait until mid-century.""9 
By this time, even though consumerism, like democracy. had its 
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roots in Europe, consensus abounded on both sides of the Atlantic that 
America represented the most advanced consumer society and that 
quality gave it an economic advantage over its European rivals.150 
European high brows eventually coined the term "Americanization" to 
stand for the increasing number of concessions to consumerism they 
witnessed at home. The concept of "Americanization" fully confirms 
the advanced nature of consumerism in America. No one there was 
referring to the phenomenon as "Europeanization." Europeans and 
Americans alike recognized the USA as the undisputed leader in this 
newest gestation of mass culture. 
Understandably, then, nothing so incensed European intellectuals 
than to have to watch the influence and appeal of raffish American man­
ners expand. Consensus continued to form in Europe throughout the 
nineteenth century that the future sided with America - for better or 
worse. J.S. Mill deemed Tocqueville's Democracy in America "all the 
more worthy of study in that it harbors within its depths the future of the 
world." Because of its capitalist potential, Marx called the United States 
"the youngest and yet most powerful representative of the West." "'f.he 
Americans may reasonably look forward to a time," Herbert Spencer 
predicted in 1882, "when they will have produced a civilization grander 
than any the world has known." 
A few years later James Bryce maintained, "America has . . .  antici­
pated European nations. She is walking before them along a path which 
they may probably follow."150 As Sigmund Skard concluded in his study 
of European attitudes regarding America, "in the best minds ...  there 
was a dawning realization that 'America' was no longer just America, 
but the spearhead of a general development, and that even the modem 
United States could only be understood in a global perspective and in 
the light of universal cultural problems."1s2 
America seemed destined for economic supremacy. Englishman 
Richard Cobden, as far back as 1835, deemed American management so 
superior that "our only chance of national prosperity lies in the timely 
remodelling of our system, so as to put it as nearly as possible upon an 
equality with the improved management of the Americans. "1si 
America's reputation as a house of ingenuity grew as it churned out crit­
ical modem inventions from the steamship (1807) to the telegraph 
(1832), to the telephone (1876), to the aero plane (1903).1s- Europeans 
jealously eyed the vast standardization of machine parts in America 
begun by the forward-thinking Eli Whitney.1ss 
In 1878 William Gladstone warned: "While we have been advanc-
Peter O'Brien 71 
ing with portentous rapidity, America is passing us as if in a canter. 
There can hardly be a doubt, as between America and England, of the 
belief that the daughter at no very distant time will, whether fairer or 
less fair, be unquestionably yet stronger than the mother. "1'6 With wide­
ly read and quoted books such as Andrew Williamson's British 
Industries and Foreign Competition (1894) or Fred McKenzie's 
American Invaders (1902), the warning turned to mantra. In 1902 
Brooks Adams, in American Economic Supremacy, declared the 
American triumph afait accompli.'" 
Nothing attested to American economic appeal like immigration. 
The numbers are staggering: five million between 1815 and 1860; 
another IO million by 1890; 23 million more by 1920. In 1917, one in 
three Americans was an immigrant or the child of one. The vast major­
ity flooded into America from Europe, and the lion's share of European 
emigrants chose the United States over all other destinations. The 
stream headed in the opposite direction (America to Europe) amounted 
to a mere trickle (mainly of malcontented American intellectuals dis­
gusted with America's philistine culture).m The almighty dollar alone 
did not draw immigrants to America. The flow con tinued apace during 
the recessions of 1856 and 1873. The newcomers came seeking as well 
the distinctive American way of life. Most embraced American norms 
and values and did their best to assimilate. E pluribus unum became a 
near reality. u9 Though the extent of assimilation can be exaggerated, 
certainly nothing like an Europeanization of America took place. 
The love affair with America was not limited to immigrants. During 
our period America's appeal expanded across the globe, including 
Europe. Roughly speaking, American political institutions earned wide­
spread admiration during the first three quarters of the nineteenth cen­
tury only to be greatly overshadowed by American popular (that is, con­
sumer) culture from the 1870s onward. The rebels ofTiananmen Square 
were hardly the first to invoke America. People around the world chal­
lenging despotism looked to America for inspiration and emulation. 
South and Central Americans fortified themselves with the success of 
the American War of Independence when throwing off the Spanish yoke 
in the 1820s. 
Though less successful, the organizers of the Decembrist Revolt of 
1825 in Russia against the controversially installed Nicholas I saw 
themselves as following in America's footsteps. The Australian dubbed 
the USA in 1831 "a model for all new countries."160 Virtually all of the 
revolutions that rocked Europe in 1848 had palpable American over-
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tones.161 Seven editions of the American constitution were published 
between April and September of 1848 in France alone.162 One Bohemian 
rebel expressed the reigning enthusiasm: "Their political doctrines have 
become the religion and confession of all countries, like the truths of 
Christianity [and are] destined to become the universal faith of 
mankind. "163 
Even the uppish British had to admit the popularity of the enfant 
terrible. Charles Darwin observed in 1859: 
There is apparently much truth in the belief that the won­
detful progress of the United States, as well as the charac­
ter of the people, are the results of natural selection; the 
more energetic, restless, and courageous men from all parts 
of Europe having emigrated during the last ten or twelve 
generations to that great country . . .  All other series of events 
- as that which resulted in the culture of mind in 
Greece ... and the empire of Rome - only appear to have 
purpose and value when viewed in connection with, or 
rather as subsidiary to .. .  the great stream of Anglo-Saxon 
emigration to the West.160 
Twenty-nine years latet, James Bryce echoed the father of evolution. 
The institutiOfis of the United States are deemed by inhabi­
tants and admitted by strangers to be a matter of more gen­
eral interest than those of the not less famous nations of the 
Old World ... for they are believed to disclose and display 
the type of institutions towards which, as by a law of fate, 
the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move, some with 
swifter, others with slower, but all with unresting feet.165 
By Bryce's time, however, American popular culture was already 
upstaging American political institutions as the world's newest craze. 
From Buffalo Bill through Mary Pickford and Mickey Mouse, the 
American entertainment industry won loyal fans in Europe and beyond. 
At the outbreak of the Great War, 90% of the motion pictures seen in 
Britain were American. '66 The French were viewing 159 million feet of 
American film per year by 1916. By the end of the war America pro­
duced 85% of the world's films.161 Hollywood's allure grew even 
stronger in Europe after the war, prompting Bernard Shaw to chide the 
American movie-making capital for "corrupting the world."168 The 
French ambassador to Washington was more generous: 
Your movies and talkies have soaked the French mind in 
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American life, methods and manners . . .  The place in French 
life and culture formerly held by Spain and Italy, in the 
nineteenth century by England, now belongs to America. 
More and more we follow the Americans.'"" 
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Prix uniques, the European version of Woolworth's, proliferated 
across Europe between the wars.170 Jazz took the Continent by stonn.1'1 
Europeans started using American colloquialisms like "gee."172 
American fashions from shirtwaists to short skirts to pointed-toe shoes 
came into vogue in Europe. 
The exact origins of the notion "Americanization" elude us but by 
the tum of the twentieth century it was uttered everywhere (in Europe 
at least). Baudelaire was surely among the first coiners of the term when 
he referred to his century as "Americanised by its zoocratic industrial 
philosophers. "171 In 1870 his countryman, Edmond de Goncourt, 
lamented that the Paris hotels were being "Americanized.""' "From the 
1870s on," Fritz Stem relates, "conservative writers in imperial 
Germany expressed fear that the German soul would be destroyed by 
•Americanization,' that is by mammonism, materialism, mechanization 
and mass society.""' Nietzsche, for instance, in the Gay Science (1881), 
maintained that America "is already beginning ferociously to infect old 
Europe and is spreading a spiritual emptiness over the continent." "The 
faith of the Americans today is more and more becoming the faith of the 
European as well."176 Rudyard Kipling, who married an American, pre­
dicted that America "will sway the world with one foot as a man tilts a 
seesaw plank. "177 So entrenched was the notion of Americanization that 
fin de siecle psychiatric literature created a "nosological" category 
called "Americanization," an illness of modem life.171 
The idea that Americanization, as contemptuous as it may be, could 
not be stopped, even in Europe, seized European intellectuals. Otto 
Landendorf's Historical Subject Catalogue of 1906 claimed, "the 
American, lacking ideals . . .  will become the person of the future even in 
Old Europe."179 In 1913 Elijah Brown forecast that Americanization 
"seems destined to swallow up Europe."''° "We have absolutely no 
choice any more," shrugged Theodor Luddecke between the wars. "The 
American way of life is simply forced on us."111 Not just Europe lay 
imperiled by the "American invasion."tn W1T. Stead published The 
Americanization of the World in 1901. A Gennan contemporary warned, 
"America represents a dreadful danger to all of humanity."m Georges 
Duhamel echoed the same theme in America: The Menace (1931). A 
year later compafriotAndre Siegfried claimed, "the United States is pre-
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siding at a general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the 
entire world. "11' 
CONCLUSION 
Permit me to use the conclusion to return to Brague and speculate 
provocatively on the nature of modern European civilization. Brague 
contends that Europe's sense of secondarity propels it to improve to an 
extent other cultures do not exhibit. In contrast to more confident civi­
lizations in the East, Europeans out of a sense of inferiority learned to 
appreciate non-European cultures and learn from them in an effort to 
advance Europe. Thus he writes, "the cultural poverty of Europe has 
been her good fortune. It obliged it to work and to borrow. On the con­
trary, the richness of Byzantium paralyzed it, got in its way, because it 
had no need to look elsewhere ...  no culture was ever so little centered 
on itself and so interested in the other ones as Europe. China saw itself 
as the 'Middle Kingdom.• Europe never did.''m This curiosity and open­
ness explains Europe's progress in the modern epoch. 
Without rejecting this idea of European opeMess, I claim that mod­
em Europe developed a third sense of secondarity in relation to America 
beyond that felt toward Jerusalem and Athens. I suggest that from 1776 
on, America so distinguished itself in terms of potential and realized 
greatness, albeit in the European imagination, that European elites 
increasingly viewed the offspring as the (inevitable) geopolitical, eco­
nomic and cultural center of the world. Put differently, America came to 
represent not only a civilization with global reach, but more important­
ly given Brague, one from which European intellectuals felt increasing­
ly alienated. We see, then, in Europe's experience with America an 
inversion of the relationship to Jerusalem and Athens. Whereas Europe 
saw itself as secondary to the ancient civilizations and sedulously strug­
gled to appropriate or even perfect them, it initially felt primary toward 
America (its progenitor) but increasingly secondary as the progeny 
matured and separated. A similar sense of secondarity, characterized by 
feeling connected to the world's center but at the same time potentially 
disconnected (and therefore irrelevant) emerged in modernity, if for dif­
ferent reasons, as it did in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. To use 
Brague's label, Europe indeed was and is eccentric, that is, a civiliza­
tion on the edge. 
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